Turkey nearly underwent a complete democratic reversal in
last week. In the early hours of the attempted coup last Friday, President
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan used an unlikely tool to galvanize his supporters when he
launched a FaceTime appeal to all Turks to descend to the streets. The Turkish
people heeded Erdogan's call, showing a great deal of maturity and courage in
facing the military and defeating the coup. A successful coup would have been
devastating to Turkey, but an unhinged post-coup Erdogan is equally
detrimental, not only to Turkey, but to the whole region’s democratic progress.
The failed military putsch against democratically elected
Erdoğan is a stark example that old autocratic habits die-hard in the Middle
East. The coup unmasked the reality of modern day Turkey, which has long dealt
with military incursions in civilian affairs which lasted until the Turkish
military memorandum of 1997, which prompted the resignation of then Islamist
Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan. But Turkey’s path towards democratic progress
has been dealt a serious blow despite the failure of the generals in toppling
the AKP leader.
When Erdoğan came to power in 2003, Turkey and the rest
of the world looked at the Turkish experience as a model for Islamic democratic
rule, that maybe the Kemalist secular principles could coexist with the AKP’s
Islamist ethos, and that a secular-Islamist synthesis was possible under robust
legal and institutional mechanisms. Erdoğan’s popularity was all the more
enviable when he presided over an impressive economic growth. In the Muslim
world, Erdoğan became the symbol for democratic renewal under an overtly
Islamist banner and a populist pan-Islamic leader who has been a staunch critic
of Israel, the rallying cry for all Arab and pan-Islamic demagogues. Erdoğan’s
opposition to Sisi’s coup in Egypt, and the brutal regime of Assad made him a
champion for many in the Arab world. Erdogan has also been so successful among Muslims
in advancing a religious discourse that he was even compared to medieval Muslim
ruler, Salah Eddine (Saladin) who conquered Jerusalem during the Crusades.
Erdoğan’s pan-Islamic popularity remained unchanged even
when he started displaying a penchant towards autocratic rule. In the years
preceding the coup, Erdoğan launched a relentless campaign against his
opponents within the confines of Turkish democratic institutions, orchestrating
sham trials known as Balyoz (Sledgehammer) whereby hundreds of
high ranking officers were jailed and/or removed from the military. Using the
parliamentary majority of the AKP, he steered the country towards an executive
presidential system and was elected president in 2014. Erdoğan repressed all
who dared to oppose his sultanistic ambitions in Turkey and appeared truly to
be the only game in town. Indeed, in his interview with al-Jazeera Tuesday, Erdoğan revealed that he was utterly surprised
when he first heard of the coup from his brother-in-law as he was vacationing
in Marmaris. Some say he was always expecting this coup; but was not sure when
this attempt would take place.
But in his state citadel, Erdoğan has always harbored a
not so secret fear of one formidable opponent, a former ally turned nemesis,
the Muslim preacher and scholar Fethullah Gülen. Gülen, who fled Turkey in
1999, and is in the US in a self-imposed exile, is the spiritual leader of an
order that runs several organizations and some 146 charter schools in the US. The Hizmet-Gülen movement is largely known for its
interfaith message of peace and tolerance around the world. But his supporters
in senior bureaucratic and judicial positions in Turkey are said to constitute
“a parallel structure” aiming to depose Erdogan’s government.
In the days after the failed coup, Erdoğan has notably
singled out Fethullah Gülen as the main culprit behind the coup, and has
started what amount to a purge of the court system and the police force, in
addition to almost one-third of the military establishment.
Thousands of
military officers, security officers, judges, police officers have been
arrested. Erdoğan has just declared a state of emergency for three months, his government suspended its adherence
to the European Convention on Human Rights, and has issued a travel ban against all academics.
Erdoğan’s post-coup plan is to dismantle whatever little
democratic gains Turkey achieved in the past. The failed coup and Erdogan’s
popularity have given him a “carte blanche” to mold the Turkish State in his
image, cleanse the political establishment of the “parallel structure”, and
tame the military once and for all. The scope of the purge will be devastating
for Erdogan’s opponents in the state institutions, and Gülen will have to fight
the narrative that he was behind a coup that most Turks, even the anti-Erdoğan
crowd, opposed.
Beyond Turkey, Erdoğan’s revanchism is a setback to the
cause of democratic progress in the region. Arab liberals have almost
unanimously extolled the Turkish president and justified his post-coup
policies. Facebook status updates and Twitter posts have almost all endorsed
Erdoğan providing various rationale for his attempts at eroding Turkish
democracy, ironically in the name of democratic legitimacy and street
popularity. Commitment to principles of the rule of law, individual freedom,
and the liberty of the press that Arab liberals so arduously fought for are
deemphasized right now. In their blind support of Erdoğan, Arab liberals’ and
democracy activists’ commitment to democratic principles has largely taken a
backseat to retribution.
But the jubilant statements about Erdoğan and the triumph
of the will of the people mask a bitter reality that Erdoğan has charted an
autocratic course that will be almost as devastating to Turkish democracy as a
military junta would have been. Erdoğan still has time to reverse some of his
reprisals and to promote legal, measured means for prosecuting coup plotters.
The failed coup should not be a “gift from God”, as Erdoğan let slip in his
first appearance after the coup in Istanbul, to settle score with rivals and
opponents.
The path to democracy is fraught with uncertainties, but
most democratic transitions in the context of Latin America and Eastern Europe
in the last two decades of the 20th century came through negotiated pacts
within the political elite. This assumes that the elite class is inclusive even
of those that are diametrically opposed ideologically to prevalent political or
social views. The whole sale purge of Erdoğan’s rivals bodes ill for the
institutional progress of Turkey and the region. Turkey used to be a model for
the region, perhaps now, we should look for another model elsewhere. Maybe
Tunisia still holds some of that hope for a Middle Eastern democracy.