*This article is originally written for and appeared in Muftah today.
While Morocco continues to be hailed as a model for
democratic reform and an exception to the Arab tempest of change, several
indictors point to the fossilized and increasingly repressive behavior of the
state. The Moroccan government has longed reveled in a myopic and contradictory
strategy of institutional and constitutional manipulation. A recent article
in the Washington Post exposes these flagrant contradictions in the
form of regime promotion of the multi-million dollar music festival,
“Mawazine,” starring the likes of Mariah Carey and Lenny Kravitz, versus its
unjust imprisonment of Moroccan rapper Mouad Belghouat, aka “El 7aqed” (the
indignant). El 7aqed was indicted and sentenced on May 11 to a year in jail on
charges of contempt against public servants for his fiery anti-police song “Dogs of the State.”
Perhaps in a similar vain to the American rap group NWA in
the 1990s, El 7aqed sought to express widely held indignation about police
corruption in Morocco. Unlike the United States though, freedom of expression
is severely limited in the kingdom and El 7aqed’s lyrics were deemed offensive
to the state.
El 7aqed’s case is but one example of the state’s purposeful
policy of promoting an environment of social activism and freedom of
expression, buttressed by cosmetic constitutional reforms, while at the same
time, undermining those same rights through summary indictments and unfair
sentences. This is a calculated strategy
meant to show the limits of freedom of the press and expression, and to define
the contours of tolerated speech.
This strategy was particularly evident in the case of Moroccan journalist, Rachid Nini, who was
arrested and sentenced on charges of "offense against national and
citizens' security." The vagueness of the charge thinly masks the true
nature of the indictment against Nini, who was rounded up for his critical
stances against the government and, at times, vociferous comments about
immorality and venality in Moroccan politics.
Morocco's attempt
to shed the relics of its past limitations on associational and informational
freedom has long been beset by unease toward the press' increasing criticism of
the state. However, if the country is to achieve genuine democratic
reform, freedom of the press must be one of the main elements of current debate
in Morocco. Reforms can only start
at the altar of the press, which is a watchdog for the travails of
state-society negotiations.
The Moroccan
government cannot claim reform and change on one hand, while continuing to
brutalize society on the other. Democracy does not work without the rule
of law and individual freedoms. Both precepts have been violated in the case of El 7aqed and Rachid
Nini. The repression against theses individuals and their work has only refocused
attention on the state’s shortcomings in managing an increasingly volatile
social and political milieu rife with indignation and dissent.
Several people I have spoken to in Morocco maintain that the
recent constitutional reforms, enacted in July 2011, are useless without the
political will to implement them, especially those articles dealing with
individual and group liberties and the rule of law. The last six months of
Islamist-led government have seen slight, but largely inconsequential changes, and,
even then, mostly in tone, rather than tenor. For instance, while the Islamist
Minister of Justice, Mustapha ar-Ramid, pledged greater reforms and
independence of the justice system, judicial progress has thus far been absent
from politically motivated cases.
During a recent workshop I conducted for some 25 social
activists in the Marrakech region, I was struck by the determination and
enthusiasm evinced by young Moroccan activists. Committed in their desire for
democratic reforms, they all expressed frustration
at the state’s lack of political will to partner and promote socio-political
projects. For the Moroccan government, social activism is only an additional
venue to exert its vast control. By drowning civil society with thousands of
associations and organizations, the state has attempted to limit the lobbying
potential of activists, and has inserted key pro-state associations that feign
independence while tacitly promoting regime interests.
Morocco is
dominated by a carefully-engineered political system, where every structure,
institution, and organization plays a particular role in advancing “makhzen” power.[1]
The regime has managed an
increasingly fragmented political party scene and devised what political
scientist Ellen Lust has termed a “divided structure of contestation” that
allows selected political opponents to take part in the political system, while
excluding others. These structures condition relations between the government
and opposition groups, dictate the rules of the game within the formal
political system, and help state agents infiltrate Moroccan political electoral
contests and civil society organization to create new allies for the regime.
Civil society has been successful over the
years in bringing about many policy changes in the areas of human rights, family
law, and gender equality. The state has, however, been able to co-opt and set
the boundaries for activism on such issues. Women's rights, human rights and
democratic reforms are but a few examples of the state's attempt to redefine
the main points of contention during electoral contests and within civil
society. Furthermore, the state has sought to fully integrate these discourses
in the apparatus of the state. For instance, institutionalization of women
rights discourse has occurred through the creation of the blue ribbon Cell for
the Integration of Women in Development (CIFD), which was entrusted with the
task of reforming the Moudawana (family code).
The slight
Islamist electoral victory last November, the cosmetic constitutional changes
of July 2011, and the semblance of a vibrant civil society serve to legitimize
the Moroccan system, but undermine democratic progress in a country that stand
as an exception to the vast popular changes sweeping the Middle East and North Africa
region. Until there are meaningful and thorough reforms to the core structure
of Makhzenite power and its feudal control over the kingdom’s economic sectors,
democratic progress will remain elusive in Morocco, a mere illusion touted in
international forums as a model for other Arab states.
[1] Makhzen refers to the state apparatus made of the
monarchy and the political elite in control of the state and economy in Morocco